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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper uses a case study of urban regeneration policy in Sheffield, UK, to explore 
local public entrepreneurship in a system of multi-level governance. Recent analyses of 
public entrepreneurs have directed attention to the macro-political structural and institu-
tional conditions that enable and constrain these actors, and to their individual character-
istics and attributes. The stress has been on the national level and on individual action at 
the expense of the agency of local networks of entrepreneurs. In order to address this 
lacuna, we consider how local policy entrepreneurs work across governance levels and 
develop ideas, institutional structures and support in pursuit of their goals, using King-
don’s notion of policy streams as a vehicle for our analysis. We highlight the contingent 
and path dependent nature of such entrepreneurship. In particular, we identify the tem-
poral sequencing of agenda shifts and entrepreneurial actions as a crucial aspect of the 
policy process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The dominant narrative of central-local government relations in the UK has been the 
power of central government to make and remake the institutional landscape and, in so 
doing, to erode the institutional cohesiveness, policy competences and autonomy of local 
political institutions (c.f. Pratchett, 2004; Wilson, 2003). However, the past two decades 
have also seen the advance of multi-level governance (Keating, 2014) and increased op-
portunities for ‘authority migration’ (Broschek, 2014) to institutional actors at supra- and 
sub-national levels, allowing greater scope for the exercise of local autonomy. The UK’s 
institutional regime is currently the subject of rapid restructuring. Examples of this in-
clude the rise of city-regions (c.f. Deas, 2014; Etherington and Jones, 2009; Harding, 
2007; Harrison, 2010, 2012; Jonas and Ward, 2007) and institutional innovations such as 
combined authorities and elected mayors. The implementation of these changes has been 
selective.  
 
The paper explores one explanation for this even distribution of powers: public entrepre-
neurship. While the concept challenges institutionalism’s limited treatment of institutional 
change, accounts often fail properly to locate the actions of entrepreneurs within a con-
text of multi-level governance (MLG), restricting our understanding of how such a set-
ting may enable or constrain agency. In a multi-level polity – or more specifically, in poli-
cy fields that incorporate institutional actors from many sites – numerous policy process-
es play out across different levels and are often misaligned. Within the UK, sub-national 
actors have been firmly subordinate to actors at higher levels and the former are reliant 
on the latter for resources to devise and implement policies. MLG is a potential alterna-
tive source of  mobilization by sub-national actors (Marshall, 2005; 2006). Successful en-
trepreneurship thus depends on how well actors operate within and across governmental 
levels and the ways in which particular policy ideas are perceived at particular junctures 
across these levels.  
 
The paper examines the restructuring of  the institutional regime governing central-local 
relations. It presents a case study of  Sheffield’s entrepreneurial actions in the field of  ur-
ban regeneration. The study demonstrates the importance of  entrepreneurial activities, 
such as lobbying, policy framing and institutional development, in producing institutional 
and policy change within a system of  MLG. However, while we acknowledge the im-
portance of  entrepreneurial actions in explaining such change, we also point to the con-
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tingent and path dependent nature of  such entrepreneurship. In particular, we identify 
the temporal sequencing of  agenda shifts across governmental levels as a crucial aspect 
of  the policy process. Overall then, we explore the dynamic relationship between strate-
gic agency and contingent opportunity structures.  
 
The paper has three parts. First, we review the concept of public entrepreneurship, draw-
ing attention to the strategies available to entrepreneurs and to the institutional con-
straints that limit action. In the second part we analyze the latter by exploring the impli-
cations of multi-level governance from Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams perspective. 
The third part presents a case study of public entrepreneurship in Sheffield. We describe 
how a policy for regenerating the city centre was developed, how actors within the coun-
cil fostered an elite consensus in the city, and how they engaged in brokerage, lobbying, 
and institution-building to obtain greater funding. We demonstrate the significance of 
alignments of national and European policy windows for public entrepreneurs working 
across levels of governance. We conclude by considering the contingent nature of entre-
preneurial activities, stressing that the scope for entrepreneurial agency is tempered by 
complex interrelations between institutional structures1 and agent-level factors.  
 
PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURIALISM IN MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
 
Variants of institutionalism - particularly of the historical or rational choice kind - have 
been criticized for having only a weak account of how rapid institutional change occurs 
(Weyland, 2008). Institutional lock-in is assumed to arise from path dependence or 
dysfunctional equilibria, breaks from both of which are difficult (Sheingate, 2014; 
Weyland, 2008). Recently, more nuanced explanations have been developed of how 
processes institutions change over time (Beland, 2007; Lewis and Steinmo, 2012; Orren 
and Showronek, 2004; Thelen, 2004; van der Heijden, 2011).However, the role of 
individual agency within institutional and policy change remains weakly specified (Oborn 
et al., 2011). Despite this, public entrepreneurs2 are seen as important influences on 
                                                 
1Recent institutional theory (e.g. Bakir, 2013) distinguishes between structures – the broader contexts with-
in which institutions and agents are embedded – and institutions – formal and informal rules that guide the 
behaviour of agents through the logic of appropriateness and instrumentality. In this paper we adopt a 
simpler framework that focuses on agents’ actions within (mainly formal) institutional / organisational 
structures. 
2 Taxonomies have proliferated in the literature, reflecting the capacious nature of the concept. François 
(2003) contrasts political entrepreneurs (politicians) with ‘state producers’ (bureaucrats) whereas Schnel-
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policy outcomes within MLG. They are a source of variation within policy subsystems 
and their activities weaken or even undermine deterministic models of analysis 
(Schneider and Teske, 1993: 725). They disrupt the status quo by offering policy 
solutions to extant but hitherto neglected policy problems or by pursuing new policy 
initiatives.  
 
For Ostrom (2005a: 1), public entrepreneurship ‘is a particular form of leadership focused 
primarily on problem solving and putting heterogeneous processes together in 
complementary and effective ways.’ Kingdon’s (1995: 204) influential perspective sees 
policy entrepreneurship as a form of policy advocacy, with entrepreneurs conceived as 
agents ‘willing to invest their resources in return for future policies they favor’ (Kingdon, 
1995: 204). Whichever interpretation is adopted, the nature and actions of entrepreneurs 
may be critical influences on institutional development and policy adoption and change 
(Ostrom, 2005b). They are involved in various stages of the policy process, from 
innovating and designing ideas to implementing or institutionalizing them (Roberts and 
King, 1991: 150). 
 
Political economists conceptualize public entrepreneurs in terms of market actors who 
are ‘alert’ to extant opportunities, or opportunities that can be created within existing 
structures (Holcombe, 2002; Schneider and Teske, 1993: 725; Schneider et al. 1995: 44, 
48; Wohlgemuth, 2000). Such actors anticipate changes already in development or seek 
to generate them themselves or with others (see below). While profit is the predominant 
motive of private sector entrepreneurs, the drivers of public entrepreneurship are 
different. The primary aim of a politician may be reduced to vote-maximization, but 
bureaucratic and executive entrepreneurs are generally claimed to have more dispersed 
and ambiguous motivations. They may wish to advance the ‘public interest’ or they may 
focus on more direct organizational imperatives, such as increasing or diversifying their 
                                                                                                                                           
lenbach (2007) distinguishes between political entrepreneurs, who are individuals who promote non-
incremental changes in political paradigms, and policy entrepreneurs, who are concerned with implement-
ing novel policies. Roberts and King (1991: 151) distinguish between ‘policy entrepreneurs’, ‘political en-
trepreneurs’, ‘program entrepreneurs’, bureaucratic entrepreneurs’, ‘administrative and executive entrepre-
neurs’ and ‘issue entrepreneurs’. Fligstein (1997) and Campbell (2004), among others, add the term ‘institu-
tional entrepreneurship’. These are important distinctions. In this paper we focus on ‘bureaucratic’ or ‘ex-
ecutive’ entrepreneurs. However, for the sake of clarity, we use the general term ‘public entrepreneurs’ 
throughout as an encompassing category as the lines between political and policy entrepreneurship (and 
indeed political and bureaucratic motivation and action) are often porous (see Bernier and Hafsi (2007: 
491)).    
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funding streams (Perkmann, 2007: 867) to gain greater autonomy and less uncertainty for 
their organisations (Carpenter, 2001; Klein et al. 2010; Lowndes, 2005). Entrepreneurial 
activities are hence likely to occur in response to changes in the external environment, 
such as ‘…basic knowledge, available technologies, social conditions, or performance of 
the existing repertoire of private and public institutions.’ (Oliver and Paul-Shaheen, 1997: 
747-748; see also Morris and Jones, 1999 and Zerbinati and Souitaris, 2005)  But 
personal motivations such as career-enhancement may also influence behaviour (Bernier 
and Hafsi, 2007: 490).  
 
The unit of analysis for public entrepreneurship ranges from the individual up to the 
organizational or even inter-organizational level. Early studies of entrepreneurship were 
focused on the actions of heroic ‘individuals who change the direction and flow of 
politics’ (Schneider and Teske, 1992: 737). But such a role could also be performed by 
groups or teams within organizations (Morris and Jones, 1999: 73; Phillips and Tracy, 
2007: 315; Texieira and Silva, 2012: 335; Wenger, 1998), or entire organizations that are 
trying to win advantage across levels of governance (see Hederer, 2007; Perkmann, 2007;  
Roberts and King, 1996). A more organization-focused approach to entrepreneurship 
underscores the importance of group learning (Roberts and King, 1996: 165) and the 
succession of entrepreneurial actors over time. Oliver and Paul-Shaheen (1997: 746) 
describe public entrepreneurship as an ‘internal team process’ whereby policies are 
developed by weaving existing ideas together rather than by appropriating a prototype 
offered by external policy entrepreneurs.  
 
While public entrepreneurs are similar to economic entrepreneurs in some respects – for 
example, opportunity recognition, risk taking, networking and social skills, reputation, 
providing a strategic vision, and so on – actors within state structures operate in 
fundamentally different institutional contexts (Carpenter, 2001; Christopoulos, 2006; 
Fligstein, 2001; Hederer, 2007; Schnellenbach, 2007). They face a number of distinct 
obstacles. Their activities are governed by political and electoral cycles, and are subject to 
other forms of political interference (Morris and Jones, 1999: 79). They are also 
confronted with a fragmented system of governance, which offers both challenges and 
opportunities. In a system of MLG, resources are distributed between many actors. As 
issues grow more complex ‘we expect [entrepreneurial] groups to supplant individuals as 
the primary unit of analysis.’ (Roberts and King, 1996: 162) In this context, (individual) 
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leadership involves brokerage across governance levels, fostering the development of 
innovative ideas within organisations and ‘setting priorities, undertaking 
interorganizational initiatives where appropriate, and encouraging and rewarding actors 
for their contributions.’ (Bernier and Hafsi, 2007: 494) Our case study illustrates this 
interaction between individual and group public entrepreneurship.   
 
Entrepreneurial Strategic Action at the Local Level 
Local-level public entrepreneurs engage in numerous activities that resemble those of 
economic actors: institutional strategy making, opportunity discovery/recognition and 
anticipatory action (i.e. timing), as well as advocacy and/or brokerage (Pollitt, 2008: 127; 
Roberts and King, 1991: 148). Public entrepreneurs hence engage in forms of 
institutional bricolage, drawing together resources from diverse sources to produce 
unexpected results (Lowndes, 2005; Lowndes and Roberts, 2013; Phillips and Tracey, 
2007). They may seek to mobilize collaborative action around their policy, which may 
help to resolve collective action problems (Bernier and Hafsi, 2007; François, 2003; 
Hederer, 2007; Holcombe, 2002; Ostrom, 1990; Schneider and Teske, 1992).  
 
Local-level public entrepreneurs employ numerous, often complementary strategies3. 
First, they may try to change the ‘rules of the game’, by creating or implementing ‘new 
laws, administrative procedures, informal norms’ (Klein et al. 2010) and other forms of 
lobbying (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2013). They may also engage in institution-building 
(Bernier and Hafsi, 2007; Lewis, 1980; Perkmann 2007), or institutional transformation 
(Fligstein, 1997). This entails constructing formal and informal networks or organization-
al structures (for example, building bureaus) (Roberts and King, 1991: 151). Entrepre-
neurs may also seek to engage in institutional adaptation, conversion and layering or re-
combination (Beland, 2007; Thelen, 2004; van der Heijden, 2011). 
 
Beyond formal institutions, entrepreneurs may try to mediate ideas and discourses within 
and between policy communities across tiers of government and epistemic communities 
(Bakir, 2009; Broschek, 2014). Entrepreneurs can engage in discursive agenda-setting by 
seeking to frame policy debates around particular ideas (Beland, 2007; David, 2015; 
Schmidt, 2010). For example, they may try to build a coalition and facilitate cooperation 
                                                 
3  It is important to stress that such strategies are rarely envisages in toto. Rather, strategies are developed as 
part of an incremental process of trial and error or imitation.    
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around a specific vision (Carpenter, 2001; Klein Woolthuis, 2013: 94). Alternatively, as 
Keddie and Smith (2009) emphasize, subnational actors may seek to influence policy 
agendas at higher levels of government by offering alternative formulations of the prob-
lem-policy relationship (policy images, pace Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Finally, they 
may engage in ‘venue shopping’ (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993) for their favoured ideas: 
a search across levels of governance for the most receptive arena within which to pursue 
their policy objectives, (c.f. Beyers and Kerremans, 2012; Coen and Thatcher 2008; 
Guiraudon, 2000; Kern and Bulkley, 2009; Princen and Kerremans, 2008). While a par-
ticular policy image may be accepted in one venue, it may be rejected in another, affect-
ing the success of a policy initiative (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 31-32).  
 
Public entrepreneurs hence work across levels of governance, seeking to shift and/or 
frame policy images which resonate with the preoccupations of relevant institutional ac-
tors (see Bakir, 2009; Beeson and Stone, 2013; Daviter, 2009; Oborn et al., 2011; Riker, 
1986). They try to build coalitions around their framing(s) and engage in lobbying strate-
gies to achieve their objectives (David, 2015; Klein Woolthuis, 2013). Successful entre-
preneurs are likely to have ‘political know-how’ and ‘persistence’ (Beeson and Stone, 
2013: 4). 
 
Recent analyses of public entrepreneurs have directed attention to the macro politico-
institutional conditions that enable and constrain these actors, as well as to their 
individual characteristics and attributes (Christopoulos, 2006; Pierson, 2004: 155; 
Schnellenbach, 2007). What has been given less attention is the potential agency of local 
networks of entrepreneurs within a system of MLG. In order to address this lacuna, we 
focus on the relationships that enable and inhibit entrepreneurship. In particular, we 
consider how local-level public entrepreneurs – both individuals and groups - work 
across institutional levels and weave together agendas, institutions, and policy at a local 
level (see also Lowndes, 2005: 305). Because of the complexity of this institutional 
setting, we use Kingdon’s (1995) notion of policy streams as a vehicle for our analysis of 
this aspect of multi-level governance.  
 
Policy Streams and Multi-Level Governance 
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Within MLG, urban governance is an important intersection where competing policy 
preferences, styles and processes must be integrated by local actors to produce coherent, 
implementable policies. However, the greater interconnectedness of policy networks 
does not mean that policy goals are shared. Differences between actors’ interests and 
priorities, and between problem definitions and solutions, may exist (Kokx and van 
Kempen, 2010). It is here that local public entrepreneurs are important, but their scope 
for action is affected by the opportunities and constraints posed by operating in a system 
of MLG.  
 
In trying to understand how policy agendas are formed, Kingdon (1995) sought to avoid 
the reification of policy problems and specified a logical (temporal) ordering for how 
these problems are addressed. There is an excess of issues that could conceivably be the 
subject of policy, yet few can receive attention. This led Kingdon to set out three ‘policy 
streams’ that may influence the selection, definition, development, sorting and matching 
of problems and policies.   
 
• Problems: Flowing through the ‘problem’ stream is a series of ‘conditions’ that 
policy makers want to address. However, not all conditions become problems 
(Zahariadis, 2007: 71). Some issues are not considered problems until they are 
perceived as such by policy-makers when indicators (for example, school league 
tables, murder rates, unemployment figures) are published and political entrepre-
neurs, academics, interest groups or the media (among others) frame the issue as 
a ‘problem’, explain its causes and, thereby, make it actionable.  
• Policies: In this stream, various ideas for resolving social problems are generated 
by policy specialists operating in policy communities (including academics, think 
tanks, bureaucrats, and so on). It is here that policy entrepreneurs (see below) are 
active. Adopting an evolutionary perspective on policy development, Kingdon 
(1995) argues that emerging policies will only be adopted if they fit with domi-
nant values and the national mood, attain political support (or avoid opposition), 
prove technically feasible, and are affordable. 
• Politics: This stream consists of factors such as changes in government or legis-
lation, the effects of interest group lobbying, and changes in national mood. Ex-
worthy et al (2002: 84) state that these factors ‘are influenced by bargaining, con-
sensus building, coalitions and compromises.’  
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Kingdon argued that these three streams, while not completely autonomous, have a 
degree of independence until they are ‘coupled’ when a policy window opens. It is at this 
point that choice is made in a political system. Such opportunities may be prompted by – 
or prompt – ‘focusing events’ or the actions of public entrepreneurs. While there may be 
no shortage of potential entrepreneurs in a policy environment, their success is 
contingent on a mix of connections, negotiating skills and expertise (Oborn et al., 2011: 
328). 
 
Kingdon’s insights were originally focused on the Congress and the apex of the Ameri-
can political system. The past decade has seen an increased interest in adapting and ap-
plying Kingdon’s insights to levels beyond central government4. For example, Exworthy 
et al. (2002) in their analysis of health policy within the UK demonstrate that policy win-
dows open (and close) independently at central and local levels of government.  Such 
accounts argue against simplistic top-down analyses of policy formation, offering the po-
tential for local-level actors to influence the development of policy agendas (see also Ex-
worthy and Powell, 2004; Greenaway et al., 2007: 723-724; Oborn et al., 2011; Petchey et 
al., 2008).  
 
Applied to public entrepreneurship within MLG, success in changing the policy agenda is 
more likely when the three policy streams are joined across three institutional dimen-
sions: ‘the vertical (central-local) dimension; the central horizontal dimension and the 
horizontal (local-local) dimension’ (Exworthy and Powell: 268-269; and the European 
level of policy introduces added complexity). Oborn et al. (2011: 328) note that the com-
plexity of multiple policy streams across MLG means that a coalition of entrepreneurs is 
required spanning different levels. Similarly, we argue that local actors can be more than 
shapers of policy handed down from above, but to a degree that is dependent on the en-
trepreneurial skills of such actors. We therefore examine the capacity for local public en-
trepreneurs to operate ‘strategically within a system which offers a range of possible loca-
tions to pursue their objectives.’ (Laffin, 2009: 24). 
 
                                                 
4 There have also been attempts to extend the analysis to the European Union. For an overview, see 
Ackrill and Kay (2011).  
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The empirical base of this paper is a case study of Sheffield City Council. Sheffield was 
chosen because it is a local authority that has successfully developed novel regeneration 
policies and secured resources from a range of sources to fund them. It has been widely 
cited in urban regeneration and planning practice as an exemplar of entrepreneurial lead-
ership (Booth, 2005; Crouch and Scott Hill, 2004; Dabinett, 2004, 2005;; Lyons Report, 
2007). This reputation has seen other cities in the UK seek to emulate its approach to 
regeneration. This makes an examination of Sheffield’s experience significant, not least 
because it demonstrates how its success was critically shaped by the timing of agenda 
alignments across levels of governance.  
 
Our research aim was to explore local agency within the context of MLG. The over-
arching research question was: ‘To what extent are local actors, in particular local author-
ities, able successfully to coordinate different policy frameworks following the advance 
of MLG?’ 
 
To address the complex nature of this question, a semi-inductive (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
grounded approach was adopted to construct a case study. Our goal was to understand 
how actors developed a specific problem frame and then sought to mobilize resources 
for action across multiple levels of government. We do not claim strong external validity 
for our findings because our study was principally exploratory in nature, with the find-
ings contributing to theory-building (Gerring, 2004; Stake, 1999; Yin, 2009: 17). The ini-
tial focus was not on entrepreneurship or policy windows; these emerged as themes from 
our interview data.  
 
The case study draws upon interviews with more than 70 actors in Sheffield and in re-
gional organisations over two phases: 2002-4 and 2008-9. The interviewees were identi-
fied via a mixture of purposive (selecting individuals on the basis of their organizational 
role, such as directors of regeneration), chain-referral (‘snowball’) and convenience ap-
proaches (Kapiszewski et al. 2015; Lynch, 2013). The lead researcher used his judgement 
when he felt that saturation point had been reached. The interviewees included actors in 
the local authority (including leading members of the council from the Labour and Lib-
eral Democrat parties, the then Chief Executive, Bob Kerslake, and other senior Council 
officers and members), businessmen, community representatives from across the volun-
tary sector, and officers from the then Government Office for Yorkshire and Humber, 
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the Regional Development Agency (Yorkshire Forward), and the South Yorkshire Ob-
jective 1 Directorate. Interviews varied in length (the shortest lasted 40 minutes, the 
longest over three hours). The interviews took place at the offices of the individuals be-
ing interviewed.  
 
All the interviews were recorded, transcribed and analyzed to identify common themes 
and emerging issues, prior to further analysis and interpretation (see Charmaz, 2001; 
Guest et al. 2012). The study was also informed by analysis of policy documents from 
European, national, regional and local levels such as programme documents, local ‘vi-
sion’ documents, strategies and plans. Our data analysis strategy was similar to that 
adopted by Oborn et al (2011), which was to utilize applied thematic analysis to identify-
ing the existence of policy windows and the actions of entrepreneurs. Consistent with a 
grounded theory approach, open, axial and selective coding techniques were employed to 
begin the process of labelling phenomena, developing categories and assembling data in 
new ways after coding, before then establishing connections between categories (Corbin 
and Strauss, 2008). Axial coding helped establish the context and causal conditions while 
selective coding established the final key themes.   
 
The findings from the initial phase of research were presented to practitioners (including 
the key public entrepreneur, Kerslake, at a dissemination event in 2007 before the second 
round of interviews commenced). This enabled the researchers to consider the reliability 
of the initial findings.  
 
REGENERATING THE HEART OF THE STEEL CITY 
 
The Problem: City Centre Decline 
 
As part of its response to post-industrial decline, Sheffield sought to foster closer links 
with the private sector through public-private partnerships (Harding, 1991) after a period 
of radical policy experimentation in the early 1980s (see Catney, 2009; Lawless, 1990; 
Seyd, 1990). This reconciliation between public and private actors was reflected in vari-
ous institutional innovations, the first being the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Com-
mittee (SERC), established in 1987. SERC was comprised of representatives from the 
local authority, the private sector, trade unions, higher education and the regional offices 
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of government departments. In response to the financially disastrous World Student 
Games, the then Leader of the City Council, Mike Bower, pushed for further collabora-
tion through the launch of the City Liaison Group (CLG) in 1992 (see DiGaetano and 
Lawless, 1999: 563-569; Henry and Paramio-Scalcines, 1999: 648-649). Compared with 
SERC, the CLG, while still led by the City Council, was more of a genuine partnership 
with the private sector. The significance of these institutional developments was that they 
facilitated the construction of a coalition within the city in pursuit of a pro-growth policy 
agenda. More concretely, it was through the CLG that the idea of a strategic masterplan 
for the city centre would be adopted (see below). Analytically, SERC and CLG were ex-
amples of early forms of institutional entrepreneurship and were forums within which 
ideas and support for regeneration focused on the city centre could be cultivated.  
 
The emphasis on property-led regeneration by the UK national government was to play 
an important - if unintentional - part in (re)defining the ‘problem’ of city centre regenera-
tion in Sheffield. The creation of an Urban Development Corporation (UDC) in the late 
1980s was of particular significance5. Initially, relations between Sheffield City Council 
and its UDC were problematic because the Council felt that it was being undercut by an 
unelected quango inserted into local development by a hostile national (Conservative) 
government (Booth, 2005). Consequently, Sheffield Development Corporation’s (SDC) 
initiatives were not properly embedded in city-wide regeneration plans. In particular, the 
£240m invested in the Meadowhall shopping development, which opened in 1990, accel-
erated the decline of the city centre’s retail sector (Lawless, 1994: 1307). This presented 
the nascent CLG with a clear problem to address: the decline of the city centre.  
 
An early response to this problem was the Sheffield Central Area Study (CAS), which ana-
lyzed the retail and office base of the city, in 1992 (Lawless, 1994) and was sponsored by 
the City Council and the Sheffield Chamber of Commerce. Later, in 1994, the Council 
and the SDC commissioned a retail study that informed the revision of the Sheffield 
Unitary Development Plan. Both studies argued that Sheffield’s growth was hampered by 
an inadequate supply of modern retail and office space and that the city centre had failed 
to secure its share of new investment (Sheffield City Council, 2002). Their findings were 
                                                 
5 UDCs were single purpose agencies, financed by central government, with a remit that focused upon the 
physical renewal of land and buildings. UDCs were given extensive planning, compulsory purchase and 
financial powers to support site assembly and to promote investment in their areas. 
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crucial in shaping the definition of the problem and solution in Sheffield: that to pro-
mote economic growth it was necessary to redevelop the city centre. However, the 
Council did not have the resources to do this. A clearly worked out policy that addressed 
this key issue had to be developed by policy entrepreneurs in Sheffield.  
 
The Policy: City Centre Regeneration 
 
The concept of an integrated regeneration strategy, called the ‘Heart of the City’, was de-
veloped by actors within the urban development team of the City Council in 1994.  Its 
focus – to stimulate economic regeneration through a comprehensive city-centre rede-
velopment strategy– was initially met with scepticism by political actors and senior man-
agers within the council, not least because it came only a few years after the financially 
crippling investment in the World Student Games in 1991 (see Henry and Paramio-
Scalcines, 1999). One former council officer (interview, 2008) outlined the reaction of 
senior officers and politicians: 
 
‘We showed it [an outline proposal for the scheme] to senior members and they 
said to me “Who gave you permission to think of this?” […] because they were 
frightened. Confidence was at rock bottom, the city was virtually bankrupt, they 
weren’t interested in any big scale schemes. So they said to us “You can do it 
[Heart of the City] as long as it doesn’t cost us any money. You can spend every-
body else’s money, but none of ours,” which is not a very easy sell to outside 
funders.’  
 
To develop the concept the City Council again engaged in institution building, establish-
ing a special purpose body called the Sheffield Development Agency, a small group op-
erating within the local authority. In conjunction with the SDC, it produced A New City – 
Sheffield’s City Centre Strategy, a report which put forward the concept of a comprehensive 
city-centre focused redevelopment strategy (Webster and Howard, 1996). In many re-
spects, the work of these actors anticipated the development of urban regeneration com-
panies (URCs, see below). The concept of the ‘Heart of the City’ underpinned Sheffield’s 
bid (SCC, 1995) to the second round of the National Lottery-funded Millennium Com-
mission grant scheme. The city was awarded £20.5 million in 1997 in contrast to its first 
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round bid that was rejected for being ill-defined and speculative (Webster and Howard, 
1996).  
 
A key group of public entrepreneurs in the early stages of the initiative was the Council’s 
City Development Agency. It identified three projects for the first phase: the Peace Gar-
dens, the Millennium Galleries and the Winter Gardens. These developments would cre-
ate a high-quality public realm and support the ‘re-branding’ of the city. However, the 
supply of finance necessary to meet the scale of these ambitions was lacking. Between 
1995 and 1997, apart from the Millennium Commission grant, Sheffield obtained only 
relatively small-scale funding from national sources such as the Single Regeneration 
Budget to support initial development work6. However, the Council was concerned that 
the discrete, ad hoc nature of such monies would inhibit an ambitious integrated devel-
opment scheme for the whole city centre and risk a reversion to isolated, small-scale pro-
jects. Public entrepreneurs within the city needed an individual who could lead and co-
ordinate their activities and enter ‘the market for financial funds’ (Hederer, 2007: 10), 
brokering agreements with an array of actors across governance levels.   
 
The Politics: Exploiting a Window of Opportunity 
 
In 1997 two critical events occurred. In April, Sheffield City Council appointed a new 
Chief Executive, Bob Kerslake, and a month later the (New) Labour Party came to pow-
er at Westminster. These changes in the local and national ‘politics streams’ created the 
potential for aligning policy windows at both levels and, ultimately, they played a decisive 
role in Sheffield’s regeneration strategy. We analyze these developments in turn. 
 
Leadership and Consensus Building  
Interviewees from across the public, private and voluntary sectors agreed that it was 
Kerslake’s leadership that provided the focus around which all the various initiatives 
could be related. The co-ordination of urban policy in the city was essentially delegated 
to him and his officers. Kerslake was an effective boundary spanner and consensus-
builder at the local level and in national policy networks. Apart from being the Chief Ex-
                                                 
6 Following Zerbinati and Souitaris (2005: 48) we see the targeting of national and European funding 
sources as a form of entrepreneurism in a Schumpeterian sense: identifying, generating and combining 
resources in a ‘new combination’.  
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ecutive, Kerslake had many other roles in the city-region, including those of director of 
the sub-regional passenger transport executive, vice chair of the Sheffield local strategic 
partnerships and member of South Yorkshire Partnership. Nationally, he also became a 
non-executive Board member at the Department for Communities and Local Govern-
ment.7  
 
Kerslake’s ability to act as a public entrepreneur was, however, contingent on the support 
of politicians on the City Council. Interviewees pointed to the importance of the Labour 
Leader Jan Wilson’s support for Kerslake’s activities, given the reservations of some La-
bour Members (Catney, 2009). Following the fall of the Labour administration in the 
city, the leader of the Liberal Democrats on the council also supported the emerging pol-
icy agenda and institution-building within the city. A number of interviewees (including 
Liberal Democrat councillors) stated that the strategy was maintained in part because of 
central government policy pushes, but also because of Kerslake’s close association with 
the project. A community activist in the city supported this view (interview, 2008): 
 
[…] it’s easy to say with hindsight that he did more what government wanted, but 
that’s where you get your resources from. If he hadn’t, you know, there’d have 
been no money and he wouldn’t have been able to do anything. I mean I have 
heard criticisms that he was in charge of running the council and not elected 
members. […] but, you know, I remember Jan Wilson saying to me “Well, he 
brings home the bacon,” you know. 
 
Kerslake was generally considered to have three key qualities. First, he was a modernizer 
of the local authority and significantly altered the structure and staff of the City Council. 
One senior business actor in the city (interview, 2008) argued: 
 
'The influence of Bob was incredible in turning the council round from a pretty 
dull, inward looking, dying organisation that was skint into a much… [better] 
functioning organisation, a lot better, but also much more attuned to regenera-
                                                 
7 After his departure from Sheffield and a period with the Homes and Communities Agency, he became 
the Permanent Secretary for the Department of Communities and Local Government and, in 2012, the 
Head of the Home Civil Service. 
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tion and there’s been quite a culture change. […] Bob’s leadership and, you 
know, one or two other people around within the city … was absolutely vital.' 
 
Second, he strengthened the elite consensus within the city around the development 
agenda, essentially depoliticizing regeneration. Third, he built central government confi-
dence by working across government levels. A broad sweep of interviewees pointed to 
Kerslake’s importance in providing leadership. Indeed, the quality of local leadership 
provided from Sheffield City Council had an important influence on the effectiveness 
with which these initiatives and governmental units were woven together, as the final 
evaluation of Sheffield One made clear (Evans et al., 2007: para 11.43 & 11.44). In Shef-
field, the engagement of organisations such as English Partnerships, Yorkshire Forward, 
Network Rail and so on, was essential in providing the resources necessary for the suc-
cessful delivery of a complex set of redevelopment projects. Interviewees described the 
key role played by Kerlsake in creating a strong sense of trust between network partici-
pants.  
 
The successful delivery of regeneration projects in the city resulted in the growth in the 
confidence of both the public and private sectors. This confidence was part of a positive 
feedback cycle which reinforced the policy agenda and strengthened the linkages be-
tween levels of governance. As the projects took shape, Yorkshire Forward and other 
public organisations started to have more faith in the ability of the city to deliver its in-
creasingly ambitious agenda for the city, particularly with regard to public realm im-
provements (interview, councillor, 2008). 
 
In essence, Kerslake assumed the role of a ‘credible’ local public entrepreneur (Schneider 
and Teske, 1993: 725). Sheffield’s policy had already been developed by a group of en-
trepreneurs before Kerslake’s arrival. However, these actors lacked resources. The extent 
to which Kerslake and Sheffield City Council were successful in drawing down resources 
from other levels of government is a critical factor here. Sheffield proved adept at antici-
pating (and partially shaping) national regeneration policy and then at exploiting oppor-
tunities at supra-local levels as they arose. It is to these activities that we now turn. 
 
New Labour and the ‘Urban Renaissance’  
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Developing a local policy consensus and building institutions only goes so far in explain-
ing Sheffield’s success. Without a change in the national politics stream, it is unlikely that 
the scale of the regeneration achieved in the city would have been possible. The election 
of Tony Blair’s Labour government provided a window within which to align lo-
cal/national/supra-national policy.  Labour was committed to regenerating Britain’s cit-
ies, particularly what was termed the ‘core cities’8 most of which were in the party’s 
heartlands. But the focus on cities was not simply a political calculation but was part of 
broader policy learning about cities’ contribution to national economic competitiveness. 
National government under New Labour was extremely receptive to a policy image that 
advocated large-scale and concentrated investment in cities.  
 
The change in the policy image was evident at both national and European levels by 
1999. It was in that year that the Urban Task Force (DETR, 1999) recommended the 
development of Urban Regeneration Companies (URCs) to spearhead regeneration. Its 
report integrated strands of thinking inside government and parts of the regeneration 
community (both academic and practitioner) about the physical (re)development of city 
centres, something with which the actors in the City Council were fully attuned. The 
proposal to establish URCs dovetailed with the emerging policy practice in Sheffield 
where the focus on city development and partnership structures was already emerging 
(see above and Catney, 2009). As one senior council officer (interview, 2008) stated:  
 
‘I think like many of those things it’s all in the timing, I suppose.  The first catalyst 
was the new Labour government had come in and it commissioned Richard Rog-
ers to do a report – you know, the urban renaissance task force [….] and that 
recommended area based […] dedicated bodies and the city was already fairly 
content with that sort of model because the city had realised probably a number 
of years… well, quite a few years before…’ (emphasis added) 
 
Sheffield One was launched in February 2000 as one of three initial URCs. For Sheffield, 
it was a natural extension of the work undertaken by the CLG and the Sheffield Devel-
                                                 
8 Sheffield, alongside seven other cities: Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle and 
Nottingham. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, these cities formed a network that lobbied for more 
attention to be given by national government to England’s leading urban centres outside London (Power et 
al., 2010: 161). The Core Cities group co-produced the document ‘Cities, Regions and Competitiveness’ 
(2003) with the Regional Development Agencies and several central government departments, which un-
derscored the importance of the regeneration of cities as a means of enhancing national competitiveness.  
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opment Agency. The URC was essentially a partnership between Sheffield City Council, 
English Partnerships and Yorkshire Forward. There was also significant private sector 
representation on the board. It had a fixed life of 7 years. Its remit was to concentrate 
resources on the redevelopment of the city centre and to integrate regeneration activities, 
an approach Sheffield had been advocating for several years. Sheffield One worked with 
already established themes and initiatives in the city (such as the ‘Heart of the City’) de-
veloped by the City Council and, successively, SERC, the CLG and the SDA. Conse-
quently, there was a substantial degree of continuity in the city’s agenda; an agenda that 
had anticipated shifts in national government policy.   
 
One of the first acts of Sheffield One was to commission a baseline study of local eco-
nomic conditions (property markets, transport, land-use, and so on), from which a ‘Mas-
terplan’ was developed in conjunction with the City Council. The plan, launched in Feb-
ruary 2001, focused on the implementation of a series of strategic projects that became 
known as the 'magnificent seven'9 (Evans et al, 2007: para. 1.9). Its lineage – building on 
the City Centre Strategy of 1994 (Ratcliffe, 2000: p.10) and the ‘Heart of the City’ – was 
clear. The Masterplan provided the framework for the regeneration of the city centre 
over the next decade and beyond. In terms of public entrepreneurship, the masterplan 
was helpful in building the confidence of the private sector and performed a useful func-
tion as a marketing device (Evans et al., 2007: para. 3.22), as well as providing a similar 
role within state organisations.  
 
‘...with some justification, Sheffield was [considered] a bit of a butterfly. You 
know, sort of “Can we have money for this? Can we have money for that?” and 
what the Masterplan did – all the masterplans do – is set out a coherent picture.’ 
(Senior manager, Sheffield One, interview, 2008) 
 
Sheffield’s anticipation of changes in national policy10 and its exploitation of the oppor-
tunities that subsequently arose were not entirely serendipitous. The first regeneration 
                                                 
9 The Heart of the City, the New Retail Quarter, City Hall/Barker's Pool, the Digital Campus in the Sheaf 
Valley, Castlegate, Sheffield Station and an Integrated Transport Strategy (Sheffield One, 2001: 1; Evans et 
al. 2007). 
10 As well as creating a proto-URC before they became official policy, Sheffield had also established a form 
of Local Strategic Partnership (Sheffield First) in 1998, before it too became national government policy. 
Sheffield First was developed in response to the proliferation of partnership initiatives in the city and the 
Local Government Association’s New Commitment to Regeneration initiative, in which the New Labour gov-
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minister in the new Labour government was a Sheffield MP, Richard Caborn, who pro-
vided signals to local public entrepreneurs that enabled Sheffield to anticipate and to in-
fluence national policy: 
 
‘Richard’s office was right next to Sheffield City Development Agency’s office 
[…] and he used to tell us what was going on and obviously he contacted the city 
council and he said “This is the big thing and we want to be going for it,” and we 
were saying the same thing .’ (Senior council officer, 2009) 
 
Entrepreneurial success is greatly aided by recruiting influential insiders who are involved 
in agenda building (Oliver and Paul-Shaheen, 1997). Here, the insider helped local actors 
by providing information on the direction of national governmental agendas and the po-
tential opportunities that might arise for the city. But Sheffield also benefited from the 
activities of the lobbying of the Core Cities network, which kept the interests of cities 
like Sheffield on the policy agenda. Public entrepreneurship was not, however, an activity 
confined to central-local relations; the European level was also an important focus of 
Sheffield’s activities. 
 
Objective 1: A European Policy Window Opens 
In the late 1990s a second supra-local window opened at the European level at the same 
time that local institution building and shifts in policy agendas were taking place. In July 
2000, the European Union designated South Yorkshire as an area qualifying for Objec-
tive 1 structural funds. Over a six-year period, the sub-region would receive £700 million. 
Sheffield’s city centre was identified as an engine of growth for the wider region. It was 
given its own Objective 1 measure (‘Measure 28’) and a funding allocation of around £35 
million (Sheffield One, 2001: 3) to stimulate investment and to create regional competi-
tiveness and growth through support for major capital projects in the city centre. Several 
interviewees claimed that Measure 28 was the result of the European Union’s receptivity 
to Sheffield’s framing of the city centre as the core of the sub-region’s economy11.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
ernment had shown an early interest. Mike Bower, then leader of the City Council, led the creation of Shef-
field First as he wanted to get Sheffield’s Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) in place early in the hope that it 
would benefit the city’s chances of maximising the amount of regeneration funding it received from the 
new government’s developing urban policy agenda (see Catney 2009). 
11 See Dabinett (2010) for a detailed analysis of South Yorkshire’s Objective 1. 
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‘…if your city centre, which is your biggest, single economic driver, isn’t driving, 
then by default your city and your city regions are not going to perform as well 
economically.  That’s the argument we were pushing and, interestingly, the European Com-
mission were pushing that as well.  […] Sheffield had to fight very hard for that within 
South Yorkshire and the European Commission were saying on the early stuff 
that had gone in to them, “But where’s your city centre, your biggest economic 
driver?” and “You are ignoring it.” […] that argument was bought.’ (interview,  
regeneration officer, 2009; emphasis added) 
 
There is also evidence in the Objective 1 negotiations that European and local actors op-
erated together to redefine the policy image and persuade national government to accept 
the measure: 
 
‘At the same time [as we were working on the Sheffield One Masterplan] we 
wrote an integrated development plan, which was required by the Objective 1 
programme, and we were successful in persuading Brussels… In fact, in some 
ways it was Brussels persuading the UK government that we should have a dedi-
cated measure for Sheffield centre itself’. (Senior regeneration manager, Sheffield 
City Council, 2008) 
 
This echoes Princen and Kerremans’ (2008: 1139-1140) insight that ‘…political actors 
can “jump scales” by constructing a new scale for a given issue. In doing so, they […] 
open new opportunities for themselves ...’ A similar redefinition of the policy image took 
place within the Objective 1 programme to the benefit of Sheffield. In short, a significant 
aspect of Sheffield’s success was its ability to exploit the opportunities offered to align 
European, national and local policy images in the policy window that opened in 1997-
2000. As a result of the local public entrepreneurs’ activities, Sheffield One was able to 
draw funding from Objective 1 and use it in conjunction with capital funding from 
Yorkshire Forward and various other sources: a form of entrepreneurial bricolage.  
 
However, the EU was not just a source of finance. Objective 1 allowed Sheffield to be 
more innovative and adventurous in its approach to urban design and regeneration in the 
city centre. 
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‘...some of the things we’ve done around public realm we had more support from 
our European colleagues who saw the benefit of that, knowing what had been 
done in other European cities, than we did necessarily from UK bodies who were 
very reluctant to think money should go into public spaces – because [they would 
ask] “where’s the direct economic output from doing X square”?’ (senior regen-
eration manager at Sheffield City Council, interview, 2008) 
 
Objective 1’s role was widely acknowledged by interviewees as crucial to the success of 
the regeneration of the city centre. In the early phases, Objective 1 (as well as National 
Lottery and Single Regeneration Budget) funding was critical in providing support for 
projects where the private sector felt that the investment risks were too high (Evans et 
al., 2007: 3.31).  
 
2008-2010: The Closing of Policy Windows  
In pursuing their activities, public entrepreneurs within the city were conscious that the 
window of opportunity to align local, national and European policy was temporary. This 
reinforced their desire to coordinate funding streams in support of city centre redevel-
opment in an effective and timely way. The opening and closing of policy windows is not 
always obvious, and is sometimes only evident after the fact. The ending of some oppor-
tunities – such as the termination of a specified funding stream like Objective 1 – is pre-
dictable (Howlett, 1998). The closing of other windows by economic and political factors 
is more difficult to foresee. The credit crunch, the subsequent recession and the change 
to a Coalition government in 2010 fundamentally altered the policy context. And Shef-
field’s agenda changed.  
 
Kerslake left the Council and Sheffield One came to the end of its operational life in 
2007. The latter was replaced by a new city development agency, Creative Sheffield, that 
framed the problems of regeneration in the city more widely than its predecessor, both in 
terms of geographical scale (it has a broader focus than just the city centre) and in terms 
of ‘solutions’ that focus more on the development of the skills of the local workforce 
and on environmental sustainability.  
 
CONCLUSION 
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Public entrepreneurship is a critical aspect of the explanation for variation in the policy 
process because it reintroduces notions of agency into institutional theory where equilib-
rium and path dependence have been stressed (Garud et al., 2007; Weyland, 2008).  Pub-
lic entrepreneurs operate reflectively and strategically within the governance structures 
that frame their actions. They must be alert to opportunities: opportunities presented by 
extant circumstances; opportunities to create new organizational structures; opportunities 
arising from changes in the external environment and from preparation for or anticipa-
tion of such changes. Public entrepreneurs work on the identification of policy problems, 
the development of policy solutions and their linkage in policy images that attract politi-
cal support and, hence, capture resources. However, such activities are not in and of 
themselves sufficient to explain success. Agency must also be set within the context of 
the wider structural and institutional context in which public entrepreneurs are located 
(Sheingate, 2014). In the context of this paper, we have highlighted the importance of 
MLG as a source of constraint but also of opportunity. Would-be public entrepreneurs 
seeking to achieve policy change have to engage with actors and institutions with differ-
ent ideas and interests to either champion a particular idea and/or opportunistically await 
the coming of a particular idea’s time (pace Kingdon). Through an adaption of Kingdon’s 
approach, it can be claimed that success is most likely when the three policy streams are 
joined across vertical and horizontal dimensions between and within local, regional, na-
tional and supra-national levels of governance (Exworthy and Powell, 2004: 268-269). 
 
The institutional framework within the UK has traditionally strongly mitigated against 
local agency. However, forms of public entrepreneurship can and do exist. Local entre-
preneurs have sought to build their institutions’ capacity and autonomy. But the success 
of such endeavours is influenced by their timing. Entrepreneurial agents utilize the re-
sources at their disposal to exploit the opportunities offered by the opening of policy 
windows (Mintron, 2000; Princen and Kerremans, 2008: 1131). But the extent to which 
such endeavours are successful is to a large degree contingent on the wider political and 
institutional context being amenable to the idea being proffered; the ability of the same 
public/policy entrepreneur to exert influence can vary considerably across time and dif-
ferent policy issues (Beeson and Stone, 2013). 
 
The paper describes how public entrepreneurship was exercised in Sheffield over two 
decades. The process was emergent and contingent but nevertheless demonstrates some 
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fundamental aspects of local policy agency. Within the local area, institutional layering 
was evident with the development of local institutions such as SERC (1987), CLG (1992) 
and, especially, SDA (1994), which paved the way for Sheffield One (2000), a pathfinder 
URC. Similarly, Sheffield One’s Masterplan (2001) was based upon the SDA’s ‘Heart of 
the City’ proposals that were, in turn, underpinned by a consensus for city centre regen-
eration between political and business elites and senior bureaucrats (a local-local action 
initiated by CLG). Thus, the groundwork was undertaken by a group of local policy en-
trepreneurs. However, the installation of an effective individual public entrepreneur 
(Kerslake) was essential for further progress.   
 
Most studies of public entrepreneurship assume a top-down policy process and focus on 
individual actors. Our analysis of Sheffield demonstrates how agency was exercised by 
both groups and an individual through anticipatory action, inter-organizational network-
ing, lobbying and the acquisition of knowledge through central government linkages. The 
Sheffield case illustrates the recursive nature of public entrepreneurship: The city’s suc-
cess in defining a clear, widely accepted policy image, in building institutions and in ac-
cessing funds facilitated further rounds of effective action as national government actors’ 
confidence grew in the capability of Sheffield’s local institutions. It also demonstrates 
how public entrepreneurs may exploit the European perspective to shape the prevailing 
policy image in a way that fits with their own strategic goals. Public entrepreneurship has 
elements that are reflective and strategic, on the one hand, and serendipitous and uncon-
trollable, on the other. But without the former, the opportunities presented by the later 
may not be exploited. 
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